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RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT
OF TRIAL BY JURY
LOWELL M. GOERLICH
According to a recent report of the Ohio Bar, February I,
1937, at page 624, the Cleveland Bar Association will sponsor
a bill which proposes to require a written demand to be made
by a litigant before a trial by jury may be had in a civil case in
common pleas courts. The bill further provides that if the
demand is not made within a specified time the jury will have
been deemed to have been waived and, if the jury is demanded,
it shall consist of eight persons unless the litigant specifies
twelve. A law of this type is not an innovation in Ohio; stat-
utes similar in intent and purpose have been passed by the
legislature reducing the number of jurors as well as requiring
prepayment of jury fees before the right may be exercised.
The underlying purpose of such statutes is to reduce the number
of jury trials so that both the expense of hiring juries and the
sluggishness of judicial procedure may be lessened. Upon this
basis such statutes are thought to be justified. However, these
statutes involve more than pure public policy, they present a
constitutional issue and it is certain that without constitutional
sanction they are invalid. At the threshold, therefore, it is
pertinent to consider them in the light of Art. I, Sec. 5, Ohio
Constitution "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate,
except that, in civil cases, law may be passed to authorize the
rendering of a verdict by a concurrence of not less than three-
fourths of the jury".
In testing the proposed statute under this provision, three
fact situations are suggested. Although they are not all pre-
sented by the proposed statute, nevertheless, they are closely
related and anticipate the same problems. These fact patterns
placed in question form may be stated as follows: (i) Is it
constitutional in view of Art. I, Sec. 5 for the legislature to
reduce the size of the jury in a civil case to eight persons? (It
is apparent that the framers of the proppsed statute sought to
evade this question by placing the burden on the litigant to
choose a jury of eight or twelve.) (2) Is it constitutional in
view of Art. I, Sec..5 for the legislature to require a written
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demand for a jury or in event of litigants failing to make the
demand to deem a trial by jury waived? (3) Is it constitu-
tional under Art. I, Sec. 5 for the legislature to require a de-
posit of jury fees as a prerequisite to a trial by jury or in event
of litigants failing to pay the deposit to deem a trial by jury
waived? (Each question contemplates common pleas courts.)
The right of trial by jury as used in the constitution is predi-
cated according to Ohio authority (for trial by jury is neither
defined nor described in the constitution) upon the right of trial
by jury as it existed at common law at the time of the adoption
of the constitution. It was said in an early Ohio case, Willyard
v. Hamilton, 7 Ohio (pt. 2.) II I (I836), "The constitution
declares that the right of trial by jury shall be inviolate; and
the only way that we can ascertain the true meaning of this
clause, is by making inquiry, whether before the constitution
was framed if jury trials were known in such cases in the terri-
tory of Ohio." Applying this test, the court approved a charter
provision permitting the assessment of land for canal purposes
by a commission rather than a jury. The court found that prior
to the adoption of the constitution trial by jury was not had in
such cases. The same test has been followed in subsequent
Ohio cases and it is now well established that the trial by jury
contemplated by the constitution is the jury at common law
existing at the time of the adoption of the constitution. Work v.
State, 2 Ohio St. 297 (1853); Hagany v. Cohnen, 29 Ohio St.
82 (1876); Inwood v. State, 42 Ohio St. 186 (1884) Belding
v. State, ex. rel. Heifner, 121 Ohio St. 393, 169 N.E. 301, 8
Ohio L. Abs. 28 (i929).
Following this line of reasoning, numerous Ohio cases have
held that a trial by jury is a trial by twelve persons. This was
suggested in Ohio, as early as the Willyard case, supra, and was
definitely settled in Lamb v. Lane, 4 Ohio St. 167 (1854). In
the latter case Justice Thurman states, "That the term 'jury,'
without addition or prefix, imports a body of twelve men in a
court of justice, is as well settled as any legal proposition can
be." Accord, Work v. State, supra; Sovereign v. State, 4 Ohio
St. 489 (I855). Other cases which have suggested that a trial
by jury is a trial by twelve persons are Norton v. McLeary, 8
Ohio St. 205 (1858); Warner v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 31 Ohio
St. 265 (1877) Miller, Recr. v. Eagle, 96 Ohio St. io6, I17
N.E. 23 (1917) ; State, ex. rel. Warner v. Baer, 103 Ohio St.
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585, 134 N.E. 786 (1921). In the last case Chief Justice
Marshall, citing Work v. State and Lamb v. Lane said, "It has
been accepted as settled law throughout the United States that
a jury is composed of twelve men, and the early cases in Ohio
are in perfect harmony with this principle."
Since it is accepted that a trial by jury is a trial by twelve
persons, our next inquiry (which is our first question above),
is, can the legislature reduce that number? It has been held
that it can not. Work v. State, supra; Sovereign v. State, supra;
Fleishman Transportation Co. v. Bishop, I12 Ohio App. 293
(19i9). The latter case dedared unconstitutional the statute,
Ohio G.C. 1558-I5, establishing a jury of six in the municipal
court of Cincinnati. Citing the Lamb case, Miller case, Norton
case, and Warner case, supra, the co urt decided that the right of
trial by jury meant a right to a jury of twelve and to reduce that
number was unconstitutional. In view of this decision, this
statute was changed to read "Provided however, that any party
may demand a jury of twelve by specifying that number in the
written demand.". In the light of these precedents, it may be
deduced that, if it is unconstitutional to reduce the number of
jurors in Ohio to a less number than twelve in courts inferior
to common pleas courts, it would likewise be unconstitutional
to reduce the number of jurors in the common pleas courts,
since the common pleas courts are certainly common law courts
contemplated by the constitution.
In numerous cases in other states courts have held in accord
with the Ohio decisions, that the common law jury is a jury of
twelve men, McRae v. Grand Rapids L. & D. R. Co., 93
Mich. 399, 53 N.W. 56i (1892); Povlich v. Goldich, 311 Ill.
i49, 142 N.E. 466 (1924)i State v. Walker, 192 Iowa 823,
185 N.W. 619 (i92i); 16 R.C.L. 2.1. Blackstone writes,
3 Black. 352, "A common law jury consisted of 12 free and
lawful men, liberos et legales homines." Other cases have held
where a juryman is ill and a verdict is rendered by a jury of
less than twelve to which number the litigants did not acquiesce
there is no verdict. McRae v. Grand Rapids L. & D. R. Co.,
supra; Povlich v. Goldich, supra. Statutes passed by legisla-
tures lowering the number of jurors below twelve have been
held as a general rule unconstitutional. In Re Eshelman v.
Chicago B. & 0. R. Co., 67 Iowa 296, 25 N.W. 251 (1885);
M'fillers Nat. Ins. Co: v. American State Bank of East Chicago,
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206 Ind. 511, 19o N.E. 433 (1934). The only circumstances
under which such reductions have been held within the consti-
tution are those in which the statute has affected only inferior
courts which had no jury trial at common law or where the con-
stitution permits a less number, Lindsey v. Lindsey, 257 Il.
328, IOO N.E. 892 (913); Groves v. Ware, 109 S.E. 5685
182 N. Car. 553 (I92I); Texas Const. Art 5, Sec. 13 permits
9 jurors in civil cases. Dictum in Baader v. State, 2O Ala. 76,
77 So. 370 (1917) approves the rule that the legislature can not
reduce the number of the jury below twelve. The overwhelm-
ing weight of authority appears to support this view. See also
16 R.C.L. 224.
As noted before the framers of the proposed statute have
sought to evade the possibility of unconstitutionality by leaving
to the discretion of the litigants whether they want a jury of
eight or twelve. Can a litigant agree to be tried by a court with
a jury of less than twelve persons? Chief Justice Marshal an-
swers this question affirmatively in the Baer case, supra. In that
case the defendant was charged with manslaughter. During the
trial one of the jurors became sick and the defendant agreed to
be bound by the verdict of the eleven remaining. The defendant
then claimed no verdict. The court held "that the purpose of
the framers of the bill of rights was to prevent the legislature
from enacting any statute which would deprive persons accused
of the right of trial by jury", but it was not mandatory on the
accused to exercise the right. If he desired he could be tried
without a jury, therefore he could be tried, if he desired, with
a less number than the constitutional jury. Although apparently
no civil case involves the same point, since the right of trial by
jury is thought to be more sacred and the burden of proof is
greater in a criminal proceeding, it may be deduced that, if a
jury of less than twelve is permitted in a criminal action with
consent of the parties, it would be permitted in a civil action.
Cases in accord with the Baer case, supra, are Miller v. State,
2 18 N.W. 743 (1928) Neb.; Pattonv. United States, 281 U.S.
276, 50 S. Ct. 253 (193o).
The second and third questions supra, "Is the requirement
of a written demand constitutional?" and "Is a requirement of a
demand for prepayment of jury fees constitutional?", may be
considered together since in both instances, if they are to be
answered in the negative, they must be justified on the same
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principle. The first is raised in the proposed statute; the second
has been raised in several Ohio cases but has never been adjudi-
cated as to common pleas courts. As indicated above, the trial
by jury as contemplated by the constitution is the trial by jury
that was in existence at the time of the adoption of the constitu-
tion. There is authority to the effect that this right is absolute
and unconditional. In the Work case, supra, Justice Ranney
said, "If it had been deemed safe to leave it to the discretion of
the general assembly, no constitutional provision was needed",
and in Gnsaullus, Admr. v. Pettit, Admr., 46 Ohio St. 27, 17
N.E. 231 (i888) Judge Minshall stated, "The right may
be extended but not abridged". Approaching the problem
in the light of these premises, it obviously follows that an in-
fringement upon the unqualified right of trial by jury, such as,
requiring a written demand or requiring prepayment of jury
fees, would be unconstitutional, since at the time of the adoption
of the constitution neither of these things was required, dictum,
Sildrman v. Hay, infra.
But upon the examination of other Ohio cases we find that
the right of trial by jury is not as absolute and unconditional
as the above cases would lead us to suspect. Although there are
no cases which deal directly with our problem as to common
pleas courts, there are cases which can be deemed to have re-
sulted in the encroachment on the unconditional right of trial by
jury which may have been contemplated in the constitution.
Four Ohio cases appropinquate our problem. These are not the
only cases on the subject, but since each reviews the decisions
before it, we are enabled to make a comprehensive study of the
whole field by employing these cases as a point of departure.
The first case to be considered is Miller, Recr. v. Eagle,
supra. Here the plaintiff sued in the municipal court of Dayton
for labor performed and materials furnished. Defendant de-
manded a jury but refused to pay the fees before trial as was
required by Ohio G.C. 1579-61, contending that the act was
unconstitutional as a deprivation of the right of trial by jury as
guaranteed by the constitution. The Supreme Court sustained
the act.
The court cited Reckner v. Warner, 22 Ohio St. 275
(1872). In that case assessment by three disinterested free-
holders was made for damages in taking land for public road
purposes. The statute involved permitted appeal from this
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assessment to the probate court where a jury trial could be pro-
cured if the appellee placed bond for the costs. The court sus-
tained the act and declared it not an encroachment on the right
of trial by jury citing Norton v. McLeary, supra. In the Norton
case the constitutionality of a statute extending the jurisdiction
of the justice of peace from $ioo to $300 was attacked for the
first time. Counsel for the defendant contended in substance
that the jurisdiction of the justices of peace as well as the trial
by jury mentioned in the constitution were the same as were in
existence at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and at
that time in cases involving more than $ioo a jury trial was
allowed; therefore, now to take away a jury in cases involving
more than $ioo would be an impairment of the constitutional
right of trial by jury as it existed at the time of the adoption
of the constitution. The court permitted the extension of the
jurisdiction of justices courts basing its conclusion upon Art. 3,
Sec. 9 (Const. of 185i) "and their powers and duties shall be
regulated by law." As to the contention of the defendant the
court said in substance that the defendant had a right of trial
by jury upon appeal and even though an appeal bond is de-
manded of the defendant, nevertheless the right remained
"perfect" and "unimpaired". The court further stated, "But
on this subject a discretion is given to the legislature which
must be so far abused, as to be clearly violative of the substan-
tial right before the court can interfere to nullify legislative
action".
Of the Reckner case, supra, Judge Newman wrote in the
Miller case, supra, p. 1Io0 "... This contention [that an appeal
bond was a burden] was not sustained by the court, the court
being of the opinion that the requirement of an appeal bond...
was a moderate and reasonable restriction upon the enjoyment
of the right of trial by jury and was not an impairment of the
right itself.. ." Here then we find the absolute and uncondi-
tional right as it may have existed at common law restricted by
the rule of reasonableness.
The M\iller case further cites Sidberman v. Hay, 59 Ohio
St. 58Z (1899), a case in which the court declared unconsti-
tutional The Cuyahoga County Jury Law, 91 Ohio Laws 795,
which required five days notice and five dollars deposit or a
waiver of the jury. The court held the act unconstitutional
upon the basis that the right of trial by jury was a subject mat-
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ter of general legislation, and laws affecting it must be uniform
in operation throughout the state, Art. 2, Sec. 26, but neverthe-
less the court used these significant words, "At the adoption of
the constitution of Ohio every litigant in a suit, such as that
between the parties below, had a right to demand a jury trial
without depositing any sum of money, or making the demand
at any particular period, before the case was called for trial."
(Italics writers) From this language it is patent that this judge
would have declared the statute unconstitutional even had it not
been restricted to a county; it was the same Judge Minshall
who said in the Gunsaullus case, supra, "The right may be ex-
tended, but not abridged." But note how Judge Newman inter-
preted this case, "In deciding that the Cuyahoga County jury
law affected the right of trial by jury, the court could not have
meant to hold that this right was affected in the sense that it
was impaired and the law thereby rendered invalid, for the in-
ference to be drawn from the second paragraph of the syllabus
is that had the law not been limited in its operation to Cuyahoga
County, it would have been preserved from constitutional infir-
mity." This language is strong and there is little doubt how this
judge would have regarded the statute suggested by the Cleve-
land Bar Association had it been before him. This seems even
more evident when in speaking for the court he held constitu-
tional Ohio G.C. 1579-61, supra, on the grounds of a "moder-
ate and reasonable restriction of the right of trial by jury and
not an impairment of the right." The language is especially
strong since he does not distinguish in his reasoning between
municipal courts and common pleas courts. By his interpreta-
tion he has narrowed the concepts of the right of a trial by jury
by subjecting it to reasonable restraints.
However, it might be argued that the municipal court is an
inferior court, Hess v. Devon, I12 Ohio St. I, 146 N.E. 311
(1925) from whose decisions litigants have a right to appeal to
a trial before a common pleas court with a jury of twelve. See
Ohio G.C. I 1215. Therefore, it would seem that these cases
concerning municipal courts are not authority for saying that the
right of trial by jury may be restricted, first, because litigants
in these inferior courts never had a right of a trial by jury,
Work v. State, supra, and second, because if they do have such
right it is perfected upon appeal to the common pleas court,
Norton v. McLeary, supra. It has been held in an unreported
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case, Doll v. Williams, Franklin County, Feb. 4, 1930, that
Ohio G.C. I 1215 which defines the appellate jurisdiction of the
common pleas courts and provides for the appeal from inferior
courts to the common pleas court, is a law of general nature
and the method of appeal provided in the statute can not be
varied in any one municipal court. If this decision is followed,
it will mean that an appeal to a court with a jury of twelve can
be enjoyed from all municipal courts.
However, the Indiana court has taken a different view of
this problem, in Millers Nat. Ins. Co. v. American State Bank
of East Chicago, supra. In discussing a statute reducing a jury,
in a municipal court to six, the court declared, "We must con-
dude that the tribunal is a court, presided over by a judicial
officer, with the same powers as to the supervision of trials, in-
struc6on of the jury as to the law, granting new trials and
arresting judgment, that are vested in the circuit courts and the
judges thereof" and therefore a jury must be provided satisfy-
ing the common law requirements. It is significant to note that
by Burns Ind. Stat., 4-2603, this specific court might be ap-
pealed from in the same manner as justice of peace courts, and
by Stewart v. J. E. Ertel & Co., 69 Ind. App. 29, 121 N.E.
66I (1919) it was held reversible error to try an appeal from a
justice court with six jurors instead of twelve. This is com-
parable to the appeal from municipal courts under Ohio, G.C.
11215. Applying the Indiana doctrine to the Ohio decisions
that both municipal courts and common pleas courts must have
juries as existed at common law, we may conclude that the
apparent restriction on the right of trial by jury such as the re-
quirement of a prepayment of jury fees in the municipal court,
would be likewise permissible in the common pleas courts.
The next case with which we are concerned, is that of Harry
Goldberg Co. v. Emerman, 125 Ohio St. 239, 181 N.E. 19
(1932). In this case the court upheld the constitutionality of a
statute, Ohio G.C. 1579-24, requiring written demand before ajury trial could be enjoyed in the municipal court of Cleveland.
This requirement raises a different question from the previous
one discussed in that here if the litigant is deprived of his right,
it is because he has neglected to do an act which it is within his
power to do, whereas, in the case of requiring prepayment of
jury fees, if the litigant is deprived of his right, it may be be-
cause the performance of the act is not within his power. Courts
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have not distinguished these situations upon this ground. Ohio
courts have held without differentiating between inferior and
superior courts that it is constitutional to require a party to make
a written demand before he is permitted a jury trial.
In the Goldberg case, supra, the court said, "It merely regu-
lates the method of making the demand in the interests of
economy and orderly procedure." The court cited with ap-
proval 35 Corpus Juris 212, Sec. 128 holding that where a jury
is not demanded it is waived. No distinction is made here be-
tween inferior and superior courts. Other Ohio cases on this
point are Billigheimer v. State, 32 Ohio St. 435 (I 877) which
held "unless the record shows that the defendant demanded a
jury, he will be deemed to have waived it," and Dailey v. State,
4 Ohio St. 57 (1854) which held to be constitutional a statute
providing that if jury trial was not demanded in the probate
court it would be waived. The charge was against selling intoxi-
cating liquors. Judge Kennon very succinctly summed up the
argument in favor of constitutionality in these words: "That
right still exists; all he has to do is demand a jury trial and the
law awards it to him ... But who deprived him of that right?
Surely not the court or the statute." Another case in point and
an interesting case because of the vehement dissent of Judge
Donahue is Hoffman v. State, 98 Ohio St. 137, 12o N.E. 234
(1918). This court held constitutional the same statute which
was upheld in the Goldberg case, supra. Although the majority
recognized the fact that the accused was entitled to the jury
known at common law, nevertheless, in this criminal proceed-
ing the court held this statute "not a restriction, limitation,
or violation of such a right". The court cited the two prior
cases. Although the specific problem involved in the Hoffman
case is apparently settled, the dissent of Judge Donahue is im-
portant in that a court might follow his line of reasoning and
declare the proposed statute unconstitutional. His major
proposition was as follows, "The right of an accused to a trial by
jury is not based upon provisions of any statute of the state but
is the right guaranteed by the constitution ... The right con-
ferred is an absolute and unconditional one." [Italics writers].
The same thing indubitably could be said of civil cases, since the
constitution guarantees the right of trial by jury in those cases
in the same section. Further he stated, "The people of the state
write its constitution. It is for them to say when their needs
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demand a change of provisions." The judge cited to sustain his
contention Slocum v. Lessee of Swan 4 Ohio St. 162 (x 854).
This case was a civil action for ejectment and the court was of
the opinion that the cause could not be tried by the court until
there was a specific waiver of trial by jury by the parties. Like-
wise he cited Gibbs v. Village of Girard, 88 Ohio St. 34 (913)
in which it was stated in the syllabus "The right of trial by jury
being guaranteed to all our citizens by the constitution, can not
be invaded by either legislative action, judicial order or decree."
He cited the Work case quoting "it is beyond the power of the
general assembly to impair the right (of trial by jury) or
materially change its character." To conclude this line of
reasoning the judge used language which is indeed anticipatory
of the statutes requiring prepayment of jury fees, "Is it possible
in this progressive age 'the dollar is to be placed above the man',
or that the protection of liberty of the individual is of less con-
cern to the state than the protection of property."
In The Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Halliday, adr.'rs., 127 Ohio
St. 278, i88 N.E. I (1933) the common pleas court of Cuya-
hoga County tried a civil case with a jury of six rather than a
jury of twelve. In accordance with a rule made by the common
pleas judge, "In civil jury cases... parties will be deemed to
have waived a jury of twelve and to have consented to try such"
cases to a jury of six, unless a demand for a greater number than
six in writing shall be filed.. .". The supreme court declared
that the common pleas court had no power to make such a rule.
This case is important on the question of the proposed statute,
in that it contains two dicta. In the first dictum the court stated
that a long line of authorities have "established a distinction be-
tween trials of persons accused of minor crimes or prosecuting
civil actions in inferior courts and criminal trials in a court of
record." The court then cited Daily v. State, supra, Billigheimer
v. State, supra and Hoffman v. State 98 Ohio St. 137, 1 2o N.E.
234 (i918). Although all the cases are for minor crimes, in
none of them do the courts distinguish upon that basis. In the
other dictum the court said, "In every one of these cases the
legislature had by express statute, established, either the right
of the court to make the rule dealing with the waiver of jury, or
had itself set forth the circumstances which would constitute,
such a waiver." From this language it might appear that the
judge was thinking that if the legislature had made the rule
1193
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rather than the court, it would have been declared valid. How-
ever, this is contra to the prior dictwm which seeks to draw a
line between inferior and superior courts in regard to right of
trial by jury.
These are the supreme court cases and from them one can
readily see that either the constitutionality or unconstitutionality
of the proposed statute could be plausibly argued. To these cases
however, should be added a recent Court of Appeals case
Walker v. Parkway Cabs, Inc., 50 Ohio Appeals 250, 19 Ohio
L. Abs. 539, 3 Ohio Op. 563, 197 N.E. 921 (1935). In ex-
amining this case it may be assumed that the judge was familiar
with the above decisions. In that light, his interpretation is par-
ticularly important. The court held constitutional G.C. 1558-
16 in which $25.00 was required as a jury deposit in the Cincin-
nati municipal court. Proof was present that the plaintiff was
unable to pay. "We find no dissent from the rule that a state
may require prepayment of or security for the costs as a condi-
tion precedent to obtaining a jury," wrote the judge and cited
for authority 32 A.L.R. 8 65 where it is stated "Statutes provid-
ing that a person who demands jury trial must pay a jury fee
before the trial begins are generally held constitutional." It is
apparent from the language of this court as well as from the
citation that this court was not distinguishing common pleas
courts from municipal courts, but was considering the bald
proposition that prepayment of jury fees was a reasonable con-
dition upon the right of trial by jury and was therefore constitu-
tional. Using the same reasoning, we may conclude that
likewise in common pleas courts reasonable restraints of the
same type would be permitted. The language of the court is
especially interesting in that it introduces a novel point of view.
It was asserted that the reason for permitting the legislature to
pass such laws was "so that the tribunal guaranteed by the con-
stitution may be created and rendered available." In other
words, to preserve the right, this court said you must have the
adequate means to make possible the jury, that is, money to pay
the jury. This court probably recognized as did the common
pleas court in Cuyahoga county in adopting the above men-
tioned rule that at times, there are not sufficient funds in the
treasury to make possible the assurance of the right of a speedy
trial by jury. Those opposing this point of view would assert
that by requiring payment, you are taking away the right from
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a great number of litigants, rather than preserving it to all.
They would say it is better to have a postponed jury trial than
no jury trial. This case is a graver imposition upon the right
of trial by jury than any previous case because this court did
not think the fact that the defendant was financially incapable
of paying for the right had any bearing on the constitutional
issue of the deprivation of the right. One can imagine Judge
Donahue's impatience with any such suggestion.
Many decisions of other states have declared constitutional
the requirements of a written demand and a prepayment of jury
fees as pre-requisite to a jury trial.
As early as 1878 a Texas court declared valid a statute
(Session laws, Acts of 1876, p. 71) making a pre-requisite for
jury trial a demand and a deposit of jury fees, Cushman &
Wife v. Flanagan, 5o Texas 389 (1878). Accord; Hardin v.
Blackshear, 60 Tex. 132 (1883) ; Cole v. Terrell, 71 Tex. 549
(I88 8); Cambell v. Hamilton Brown Shoe Co., 81 Tex. 104
(189I)i Estacado Oil Co. v. Parker, 36 S.W. (2d) 1095
(Tex. App. 1930); Public Indemnity Co. v. Pearce, 56 S.W.
(2d) 9o6, (Tex. App. 1933). For the present Texas statute
see Art. 2124, Texas Statutes 1928 ; which is applicable to both
district and county courts.
In California the collection of jury fees before trial has been
permitted as a reasonable rule of the court, Conneau v. Gels,
73 Cal. 176, 14 Pac. 580 (1887)5 Adams v. Crawford, 116
Cal. 48 Pac. 488 (1897); Naphtaly v. Rovegno, 130 Cal. 639,
63 Pac. 66, (19oo) i Norland v. Gould, 200 Cal. 7o6, 254 Pac.
56o (1927). On the authority of the Norland case it was held
in Gray v. Craig, 127 Cal. App. 374, I5 Pac. (2d) 762 (1932)
that a statute requiring a deposit of jury fees was constitutional.
The same conclusion was reached in Davis v. Conant, 51 Pac.
(2d) 151 (935); Bennett v. Hillman, 37 Cal. App. 586, 174
Pac. 362 (1918) ; City of Los Angeles v. Zeller, 176 Cal. 166,
167 Pac. 849 (1917) ;Deberry v. Cavalier, 297 Pac. 61 (Cal.
app.) (1931). The attitude of the California court may be
summed up in these words from Conneau v. Geis, siupra, "A
rule requiring the fee to be paid in advance is a reasonable pre-
caution to prevent the jurors from being defrauded by un-
scrupulous parties, and to prevent the demand of a jury being
used as a pretext to obtain continuance and stifle justice."
The leading case in Minnesota and one cited by many
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authorities is Adams v. Corriston, 7 Minn. 456 (Gil. 365)
(1862). This was a civil suit in a district court in which the de-
fendant did not deposit jury fees required by statute. The case
was tried by the court. The court declared that the constitution
did not guarantee a citizen a right to litigate without expense
"but simply protects him from imposition of such terms as un-
reasonably and injuriously interfere with his right to a remedy
." The same result was reached in Rollins v. Nolting, 53
Minn. 232, 54 N.W. 1I18 (893) and McGeagk v. Nord-
berg, 53 Minn. 235 (893). In the latter case it was said that
the power of the legislature to require a prepayment of jury
fees is "undoubted."
The court in Williams v. Gottshalk, 231 Ill. 175, 83 N.E.
141 (907) cited with approval Adams v. Corriston, supra,
quoting therefrom that if the constitution means that we shall
litigate without price there is an end to all fees from the issuing
of the summons to the entry of satisfaction of judgment. The
implication is that the framers of the constitution did not intend
that parties should be free to litigate without cost. In accord
with this case is Morrison Hotel Co. & Restaurant Co. v.
Kirsner, 245 Ill. 431, 92 N.E. 285 (191o) and Simonv. Reilly,
321 Ill. 431, i51 N.E. 884 (1926). In the former case the
court said, "It is not a right to command the services of a jury
without cost, but is of the same nature as the right to have official
services performed by public officers, and the requirement of a
payment of a reasonable amount for jury fees, such as will
necessarily be required in every jury trial, is not a denial or
encroachment upon the right." Illinois has the same constitu-
tional provision as Ohio.
In Adae v. Zangs, 41 Iowa 536 (1875) the court in in-
terpreting the bill of rights Sec. 9, "the trial by jury shall re-
main inviolate," said, "It does not either directly or by implica-
tion provide that this right shall be enjoyed without expense
... the party enjoys the right inviolate if he is willing to incur
the expense." This case was followed by Steel v. R. R. Co., 43
Iowa 1o9 (1876) and Conners v. Burlington R. R. Co., 74
Iowa 383, 37 N.W. 966 (1888). The later case held constitu-
tional a statute providing for trial by jury of six unless fees
were provided for twelve, in a city superior court. The Steel
case recognized that the jury contemplated was the jury as it
existed at common law.
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Beers v. Beers, 4 Conn. 535 ( 823) is a case frequently
cited. In that case the court was considering the constitutionality
of a statute enlarging the jurisdiction of the justice of peace
courts. Chief Justice Hosmer said, "An instrument remains in-
violate, if it is not infringed and by a violation of the trial by
jury, I understand taking it away, prohibiting it, or subjecting
it to unreasonable and burdensome regulations (Italics writers),
which, if they do not amount to literal prohibitions, are, at least,
virtually of that character. It could never be the intention of the
constitution to tie up the hands of the legislature, so that no
change of jurisdiction could be made and no regulation even of
the right of trial by jury, could be had... "
In Randall v. Kehlor, 6o Me. 37 (1872) the court followed
the reasonable restriction doctrine and held a statute which re-
quired prepayment of jury fees constitutional. In Nichols v.
Cherry, 22 Utah 5, 6o Pac. I 103 (19oo) and Ward Lemon v.
McCabe 73 Pac. 443 (Ariz. i89o) similar statutes affecting
district courts were held constitutional without much discussion.
In Venine v. Archibald, 3 Colo. 163 (1877) approving
Randall v. Kehlor, supra, and Adams v. Corriston, supra, the
court held constitutional a deposit of twenty dollars required as
a jury fee in the probate court, stating, "This is a matter resting
in the discretion of the legislature, and the courts will not inter-
fere unless the fixed fee should amount to a practical prohibition
of the right."
In Rhode Island with the same constitutional provisions as
Ohio a reasonable restraint upon the right of trial by jury is
permitted. In Mandeville, Brooks and Chaffee v. Fritz, 50
R.I. 513, 149 At. 859 (193o) a statute requiring a written de-
mand was declared a reasonable restraint. In Alabama a written
demand or waiver is considered permissible. McClellen v.
State, 118 Ala. 122, 23 So. 732 (1898); Redv. State, 169 Ala.
9, 53 So. 908 (19io); Ireland v. State, I1 Ala. App. 155, 65
So. 443 (I914); Daley v. State, 74 So. 843, 16 Ala. App. 7
(1917).
It was intimated in the Ohio case of Walker v. Parkway
Cabs Inc. that there is no doubt as to the proposition that a
legislature can demand prepayment of jury fees. However, in
LeBowev. Balthozer, I8O Wis. 419, 193 N.W. 244, 32A.L.R.
862 (1923) the court declared a statute unconstitutional which
required a two dollar advance fee for each juror in a municipal
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court. It did not overrule a formef Wisconsin case Reliance
Auto Repair Co. v. Nugent, i59 Wis. 488, i49 N. W. 377
(i917) which held valid a statute requiring prepayment of
twelve dollars as jury fees. However, had that case been be-
fore this court, this court from its insistence on the right of trial
by jury unimpaired would have apparently declared the statute
unconstitutional. Under the circumstance the court declared
that a difference between twelve dollars and twenty-four dol-
lars was enough to make the second provision unreasonable
even if the first was reasonable. This is the language of the
judge with which Judge Donahue would probably agree "Man-
ifestly the municipal court will deal with the poorer classes of
litigants, but these litigants are entitled to the same rights and
privileges under the constitution as those of larger possessions."
In conclusion, to answer the questions raised in the first part
of this discussion in summary form, we find:
i. Ohio courts as well as other state courts have declared
unconstitutional legislation reducing the number of jurors be-
low the common law number, twelve, but have upheld a re-
duction if it is acquiesced in by the parties.
2. Ohio courts as well as other courts have held constitu-
tional legislation requiring a written demand to be made as a
prerequisite of trial by jury, without differentiating between
inferior and superior courts.
3. Ohio courts as well as other state courts have upheld the
constitutionality of legislation requiring the prepayment of
jury fees as a prerequisite of trial by jury without differentiat-
ing between inferior and superior courts.
Propositions (2) and (3) may be challenged in their appli-
cation to common pleas courts in that
(a) No Ohio decisions have established a precedent for the
constitutionality of legislation affecting the right of trial by jury
in the above cases in the common pleas courts since all the de-
cisions have concerned inferior courts.
(b) Some Ohio decisions have held the right of trial by
jury to be absolute and unconditional, with which the legisla-
ture cannot interfere. Upon this basis as a major premise, a
court could hold that the contemplated legislation would in-
fringe upon that right in common pleas courts. It might recon-
cile such a conclusion with the apparent restrictions upon the
right in municipal courts by reasoning that these restrictions are
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not in reality infringements on the right because no right exists
in these courts inasmuch as from each, a litigant can have an
appeal to a court with a jury of twelve.
It is submitted that there is an apparent trend in the Ohio
decisions away from the idea that the right of trial by jury is
an absolute and unconditional right and a trend toward a more
narrow and limited interpretation of the right.
